Uno de los tópicos principales de la teoría clásica del derecho natural es el de la relación entre derecho natural y positivo. Para todos los autores clásicos, el derecho positivo encuentra su origen en los principios universales del derecho, que Santo Tomás ha llamado lex naturalis. Pero estos principios universales del derecho son tan generales e inespecíficos, que para formar parte de un ordenamiento jurídico concreto (en una comunidad política concreta) necesitan de alguna especificación. Este modo de «especificar» los (...) preceptos naturales de moralidad es lo que se llama determinación, que es el tema de nuestro trabajo. (shrink)

Resumen: El espacio dramático de Michel Tremblay, “tesoro nacional” de Quebec, está poblado por personajes que se enfrentan casi siempre a la alienación y al deseo de encontrar, o incluso de crear, su propia identidad. Los héroes tremblayanos, cualquiera que sea su orientación sexual y posición en la sociedad, realizan un paso desde la inactividad hasta la acción para desgajarse del orden preestablecido. A veces incapaces de cambiar su situación, a veces felices al poder, por fin, contestar a la pregunta (...) “¿quién soy yo?”, los personajes del teatro de Tremblay siguen siendo representativos de la sociedad quebequense que, durante el período de la llamada Revolución tranquila, se vio sometida a unos profundos cambios identitarios. A lo largo de la evolución social del Quebec de los años sesenta y setenta del pasado siglo, se fueron estableciendo paralelismos entre la toma de conciencia identitaria de la sociedad y la de los personajes dramáticos de Trembley. Así, estos últimos se convertirían en alegorías de la estructura social en por lo menos dos dimensiones, moral y cultural, en el caso de Belles-Sœurs y À toi, pour toujours, ta Marie-Lou, donde se incuban las frustraciones propias de unas heroínas abrumadas por la cultura patriarcal (impotente en todos los ámbitos y ante todo el sexual), representada a su vez por la pieza Hosanna, a la que se la puede considerar como el símbolo de la expresión social de la homosexualidad y de la identidad sexual en general. En consecuencia, la finalidad de este artículo sería la reflexión misma acerca de unas (r)evoluciones teatrales que reflejarían las llevadas a cabo por la Revolución tranquila dentro de toda la sociedad. Abstract: Michel Tremblay's dramatic space, Quebec’s “national treasure”, is populated by characters who are almost always confronted with alienation and the desire to rediscover, and even to create, their own identity. The heroes of Tremblay, whatever their sexual orientation and social positions are, have the story of a passage from inaction till the act of tearing themselves away from the pre-established order. Sometimes incapable of changing their situation, sometimes happy to finally be able to answer the question “Who am I?”, the characters in the Tremblayan theatre are at all times representatives of the Quebec society, which, during the Quiet Revolution, suffered profound changes in identity. Throughout the social evolution in Quebec in the 1960s and 1970s, the awareness of the identity of the society and that of the dramatic characters are two matters that coexist in parallel manner. Thus, the latter become allegories of the social structure on at least two levels: moral and cultural, in the case of the Belles-Sœurs and À toi, pour toujours, ta Marie-Lou representing several frustrations: of the heroines, overwhelmed by the powerless patriarchal culture; sexual, represented for example by Hosanna being the symbol of the social expression of homosexuality and sexual identity in general; and finally, actional, as in the case of Sainte Carmen de la Main, which constitutes a message to Québécois to take their destiny in their hands. The main objective of the article is to bring some reflections on theatrical (r)evolutions which reflected the changes of the Quiet Revolution within the entire society. (shrink)

El presente trabajo intenta mostrar la naturaleza de la determinatio. El iusnaturalismo clásico la concibe como uno de los modos de derivarse la ley humana desde la ley natural, especialmente como el modo de derivación del derecho positivo o simplemente legal. Si bien Santo Tomás y los escolásticos tratan este problema, no detallan, sin embargo, el procedimiento y modalidad de la determinación. De ahí que nos parezca pertinente el estudio de este modo de crearse el derecho y la ley.

The present article aims to analyze, from literary studies, the aspects of the life of Tomás Carrasquilla that, reflected in his historical novel La marquesa de Yolombó, contributed to the creation of Yolombó as a literary universe that exposes the tensions of creation identity of the Colombian nation. This purpose is achieved through three moments: the first, the identification of bibliographic sources that within literary criticism have addressed the biographical aspects of the author; the second, the exploration of the (...) mining route that led the first Spanish settlers, established in the municipality of Cancán, to migrate to neighboring municipalities such as Yolombó and Santo Domingo and, thirdly, the review of the influences of the oral accounts of the Carrasquilla family in the composition of the novel. It is concluded that the tragic fate that the character of Bárbara Caballero faces in the work may represent a rejection of the author towards the realistic spirit and submission to the Spanish crown of the legendary Marchioness. This hypothesis is based on the fact that the historical Bárbara, the writer's great-great-great aunt, was out of tune in the middle of a family that was favorable to the independence cause, such is the case of José María Córdova, distinguished hero of independence, related to Carrasquilla in the same degree of consanguinity as Bárbara Caballero. Finally, in methodological terms, this work is developed as a documentary investigation whose level is interpretive. (shrink)

This article examines the connecting lines between the Chilean Project Cybersyn’s interface design, the German Hochschule für Gestaltung Ulm and its cybernetically inspired approaches towards information design, and later developments in interaction design and the emerging field of Human–Computer Interaction in the USA. In particular, it first examines how early works of designers Tomàs Maldonado and Gui Bonsiepe on operative communication, that is, language-independent pictogram systems and visual grammars for computational systems, were intertwined with attempts to ground industrial design in (...) a scientific methodology, to address an era of computing machines, and to develop the concept of the interface as a heuristic for a renovated design thinking. It thereby also reconstructs further historical vanishing lines—e.g. the pictorial grammar of Otto Neurath’s ISOTYPE—of the development of the ‘ulm model’ of design. Second, the article explores how an apprehension of first-order cybernetics in West Germany—e.g. represented by hfg ulm staff like Max Bense or Abraham Moles, merged with Cybersyn’s second-order cybernetics ideas, as represented by Stafford Beer’s Viable System Model. And third, it asks about a further conceptual turn regarding an understanding of design which resulted in a focus on communicative interaction, e.g. in the later works of Fernando Flores and Terry Winograd on HCI, or in Beer’s Team Syntegrity approach. As an effect, the text will explore a specific and international network of cybernetic thinking between Latin America, Europe, and North America which emerged around Project Cybersyn, and which was occupied with questions of HCI, a democratization of design, and intelligence amplification. (shrink)

El objetivo del presente estudio es analizar algunos aspectos vinculados a la interpretación de la ley humana y su causa final en el pensamiento del teólogo, f ilósofo y jurista Español Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). En algunos autores resulta indudable su pertenencia a un modo de pensar determinado. Ello se observa, por mencionar algunos ejemplos, en los casos de Alberto Magno y Tomás de Aquino —identiicados con la edad media—. Por el contrario otros autores, aún medievales, desarrollaron doctrinas que se (...) constituyeron en preludio de elaboraciones posteriores modernas. Por este motivo tales figuras resultan fuertemente vinculadas a al- gunas corrientes de pensamiento modernas. Aquí puede mencionarse a Escoto, Ockham y Marsilio de Padua. Esta claridad recientemente señalada no se observa en relación a Francisco Suárez quien aparece como un autor controvertido y considerado de transición, por lo menos temporalmente, entre edad media y moderna. Las discusiones actuales en torno a Suárez se deben a la inexistencia de un cierto consenso respecto al lugar que le corresponde a su doctrina, especialmente filosófico-política, entre las concepciones que caracterizan a los períodos antiguo-medieval y moderno. Por estos motivos esta investigación persigue def inir la ubicación del pensamiento suareciano, en relación al tema propuesto, y de acuerdo a lo que nuestro autor expone en su Tratado de la Ley. (shrink)

Este artículo examina las figuras del crimen y la sexualidad dentro del cine argentino con el interés de reflexionar sobre el modo en que se construyen imágenes sobre determinados cuerpos en procesos narrativos que exponen a los sujetos representados en contigüidad con ideas del orden cultural. Se trata de procedimientos simbólicos que, al enlazar por medio del registro audiovisual, cuerpos concretos con prácticas y conductas establecen parámetros de reproducción social. La toma de posición de la cámara no repone la pregunta (...) de la pertinencia de adoptar la perspectiva de la víctima o el victimario, sino que implica reflexionar sobre la manera en que la aparición de un rostro y un cuerpo precisos, en multiplicación y contigüidad (con aspectos que conectan imaginariamente la clase, la etnicidad y el género), quedan ligados con una referencialidad que repite o invierte un proceso de afirmación social. Con una metodología que retoma las prácticas del análisis cinematográfico, las herramientas de la historiografía del arte y los planteos de la filosofía política como trasfondo de ciertas preocupaciones teóricas, se desarrollan estas problemáticas desde un recorrido por las nociones sobre el cine de género, algunos filmes contemporáneos que retratan el conurbano y particularmente el cine de José Celestino Campusano. (shrink)

El presente texto es una indagación del concepto de utopía propuesto por el filósofo colombiano Darío Botero Uribe, en relación con el concepto de disenso expuesto por el filósofo francés Jacques Ranciére. El pensamiento político de los dos autores toma como centro de las transformaciones políticas el movimiento individual ético en forma de acción política en vía de trasformación de diferentes formas de dominación presentes en las sociedades actuales. La intención entonces se centra en la estética como disputa de la (...) reformulación del campo social, económico y político, que coloca lo político en permanente contingencia y devenir, por lo que nunca existe un proyecto político último o ‘verdadero’ esencial, a manera de los grandes movimientos del siglo XX, sino que en eco de la propuesta foucaultiana los dos autores sostienen una forma de estética de la existencia en cuanto acción política. (shrink)

Con base en la propuesta de Norberto Bobbio en El problema de la guerra y las vías de la paz, de 1979, este artículo presenta una aproximación a la relación antitética entre la guerra y el derecho, es decir, aquella en que se considera la guerra como antítesis del derecho, en el contexto histórico de la guerra civil de 1859 a 1862 en la Confederación Granadina. El análisis teórico planteado, que remite a la visión estatalista y moderna de la guerra (...) civil, se complementa con un componente histórico, por medio de un ejercicio de rastreo de sentidos de la mencionada relación antitética, en las cartas que, a propósito de algunos eventos de la guerra citada, intercambiaron el presidente Mariano Ospina y el general Tomás Cipriano de Mosquera. (shrink)

'Everyone knows what attention is’ according to William James. Much work on attention in psychology and neuroscience cites this famous phrase only to quickly dismiss it. But James is right about this: ‘attention’ was not introduced into psychology and neuroscience as a theoretical concept. I argue that we should therefore study attention with broadly the same methodology that David Marr has applied to the study of perception. By focusing more on Marr's Computational Level of analysis, we arrive at a unified (...) answer to the question of what attention is, what role it plays in the mind, and why organisms like us have that capacity. I propose a methodology for studying attention at Marr's Computational Level that optimizes in a three-dimensional space: it should capture core aspects of our first-person experience of attention, be explanatorily powerful in psychology and neuroscience, and fertile in an interdisciplinary context. I show how this methodology leads to what I call the priority structure account of attention. Attention is what organizes current information to make it more useful for the organism. We can identify it by four features. Attention, in this way, helps a cognitive system to integrate its informational state with its current motivational state. I describe how this account improves on alternatives and shows why attention is a useful concept in many disciplines and for connecting them. -/- This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Psychological Capacities Psychology > Attention Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science. (shrink)

Modalists think that knowledge requires forming your belief in a “modally stable” way: using a method that wouldn't easily go wrong, or using a method that wouldn't have given you this belief had it been false. Recent Modalist projects from Justin Clarke-Doane and Dan Baras defend a principle they call “Modal Security,” roughly: if evidence undermines your belief, then it must give you a reason to doubt the safety or sensitivity of your belief. Another recent Modalist project from Carlotta Pavese (...) and Bob Beddor defends “Modal Virtue Epistemology”: knowledge is a belief that is maximally modally robust across “normal” worlds. We'll offer new objections to these recent Modalist projects. We will then argue for a rival view, Explanationism: knowing something is believing it because it's true. We will show how Explanationism offers a better account of undermining defeaters than Modalism, and a better account of knowledge. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that our ordinary English words man and woman are “gender terms,” and gender is distinct from biological sex. That is, they believe womanhood and manhood are not defined even partly by biological sex. This sex/gender distinction is one of the most influential ideas of the twentieth century on the broader culture, both popular and academic. Less well known are the reasons to think it’s true. My interest in this paper is to show that, upon investigation, the arguments (...) for the sex/gender distinction have feet of clay. In fact, they all fail. We will survey the literature and tour arguments in favor of the sex/gender distinction, and then we’ll critically evaluate those arguments. We’ll consider the argument from resisting biological determinism, the argument from biologically intersex people and vagueness, the argument from the normativity of gender, and some arguments from thought experiments. We’ll see that these arguments are not up to the task of supporting the sex/gender distinction; they simply don’t work. So, philosophers should either develop stronger arguments for the sex/gender distinction, or cultivate a variety of feminism that’s consistent with the traditional, biologically-based definitions of woman and man. (shrink)

Many contemporary epistemologists hold that a subject S’s true belief that p counts as knowledge only if S’s belief that p is also, in some important sense, safe. I describe accounts of this safety condition from John Hawthorne, Duncan Pritchard, and Ernest Sosa. There have been three counterexamples to safety proposed in the recent literature, from Comesaña, Neta and Rohrbaugh, and Kelp. I explain why all three proposals fail: each moves fallaciously from the fact that S was at epistemic risk (...) just before forming her belief to the conclusion that S’s belief was formed unsafely. In light of lessons from their failure, I provide a new and successful counterexample to the safety condition on knowledge. It follows, then, that knowledge need not be safe. Safety at a time depends counterfactually on what would likely happen at that time or soon after in a way that knowledge does not. I close by considering one objection concerning higher-order safety. (shrink)

Do the facts of evolution generate an epistemic challenge to moral realism? Some think so, and many “evolutionary debunking arguments” have been discussed in the recent literature. But they are all murky right where it counts most: exactly which epistemic principle is meant to take us from evolutionary considerations to the skeptical conclusion? Here, I will identify several distinct species of evolutionary debunking argument in the literature, each one of which relies on a distinct epistemic principle. Drawing on recent work (...) in epistemology, I will show that most of these initially plausible principles are false, spoiling the arguments that rely on them. And we will see that each argument threatens only one popular view of moral psychology: a “Representationalist” view on which our moral judgments rely crucially on a mental intermediary—e.g. a sentiment, gut reaction, or affect-laden intuition—delivered by our evolved moral faculty. In the end, only one evolutionary debunking argument remains a menace: an “ Argument from Symmetry ” that I will introduce to the literature. But we will see that it should worry only all naturalists, pressuring them into a trilemma: give up moral realism, accept a rationalism that is incongruous with naturalism, or give up naturalism. Non-naturalists are free and clear. (shrink)

Feminism has long grappled with its own demarcation problem—exactly what is it to be a woman?—and the rise of trans-inclusive feminism has made this problem more urgent. I will first consider Sally Haslanger’s “social and hierarchical” account of woman, resulting from “Ameliorative Inquiry”: she balances ordinary use of the term against the instrumental value of novel definitions in advancing the cause of feminism. Then, I will turn to Katharine Jenkins’ charge that Haslanger’s view suffers from an “Inclusion Problem”: it fails (...) to class many trans women as women. Jenkins offers a novel norm-relevancy account of woman to avoid the Inclusion Problem. Unfortunately, Jenkins’ account has serious internal problems, i.e. problems by Jenkins’ own lights: it is unintelligible, or it suffers from an Inclusion Problem of its own. After that, I will develop novel arguments for the conclusion that the project of Ameliorative Inquiry is both incoherent and also impossible to complete—at least, impossible to complete in a trans-inclusive way. Trans-inclusive feminism, therefore, would do well to move beyond Ameliorative Inquiry. Insofar as that’s not possible, trans-inclusive feminism inherits the incoherence of Ameliorative Inquiry. (shrink)

What is attention? How does attention shape consciousness? In an approach that engages with foundational topics in the philosophy of mind, the theory of action, psychology, and the neurosciences this book provides a unified and comprehensive answer to both questions. Sebastian Watzl shows that attention is a central structural feature of the mind. The first half of the book provides an account of the nature of attention. Attention is prioritizing, it consists in regulating priority structures. Attention is not another element (...) of the mind, but constituted by structures that organize, integrate, and coordinate the parts of our mind. Attention thus integrates the perceptual and intellectual, the cognitive and motivational, and the epistemic and practical. The second half of the book concerns the relationship between attention and consciousness. Watzl argues that attentional structure shapes consciousness into what is central and what is peripheral. The center-periphery structure of consciousness cannot be reduced to the structure of how the world appears to the subject. What it is like for us thus goes beyond the way the world appears to us. On this basis, a new view of consciousness is offered. In each conscious experience we actively take a stance on the world we appear to encounter. It is in this sense that our conscious experience is our subjective perspective. (shrink)

What is a woman? The definition of this central concept of feminism has lately become especially controversial and politically charged. “Ameliorative Inquirists” have rolled up their sleeves to reengineer our ordinary concept of womanhood, with a goal of including in the definition all and only those who identify as women, both “cis” and “trans.” This has proven to be a formidable challenge. Every proposal so far has failed to draw the boundaries of womanhood in a way acceptable to the Ameliorative (...) Inquirists, since not all those who identify as women count as women on these proposals, and some who count as women on these proposals don’t identify as women. This is the Trans Inclusion Problem. Is there any solution? Can there be? Recently, Katharine Jenkins, pointing to the work of Mari Mikkola, suggests that the Trans Inclusion Problem can be “deflated” rather than solved. We will investigate this proposal, and show that, unfortunately, Jenkins is mistaken: Mikkola’s project will not help us answer the Trans Inclusion Problem. After that, we’ll look at Robin Dembroff’s suggestion that we “imitate” the linguistic practices of trans inclusive and queer communities, and we will evaluate whether this would help us solve the Trans Inclusion Problem. Unfortunately, this strategy also fails to solve the problem. By the end, we’ll have a better appreciation of the challenges faced by Ameliorative Inquirists in their project of redefining “woman,” and clearer view of why the Trans Inclusion Problem cannot, in fact, be solved. That’s primarily because, no matter what it means to be a woman, it’s one thing to be a woman, and another thing to identify as a woman. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is the enterprise of evaluating and improving our representational devices. But how should we conduct this enterprise? One increasingly popular answer to this question proposes that conceptual engineering should proceed in terms of the functions of our representational devices. In this paper, we argue that the best way of understanding this suggestion is in terms of normative functions, where normative functions of concepts are, roughly, things that they allow us to do that matter normatively (for example, things in (...) virtue of which we have normative reasons to have these concepts). Not only does this introduce a novel view about functions to the literature. This proposal also fits more naturally than the alternatives with conceptual engineering as a normative enterprise, and it allows functions to play all of the explanatory roles assigned to them in the conceptual engineering literature. Our discussion of the explanatory advantages of normative functions also advances the understanding of the ways in which concepts can be authoritative, what this means for conceptual engineering, and highlights the importance of political philosophy for thinking about conceptual engineering in practice. Furthermore, the paper explicates what kind of role considerations about function can and should actually play in conceptual engineering. (shrink)

In an essay recently published in this journal (“Is Safety in Danger?”), Fernando Broncano-Berrocal defends the safety condition on knowledge from a counterexample proposed by Tomas Bogardus (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2012). In this paper, we will define the safety condition, briefly explain the proposed counterexample, and outline Broncano-Berrocal’s defense of the safety condition. We will then raise four objections to Broncano-Berrocal’s defense, four implausible implications of his central claim. In the end, we conclude that Broncano-Berrocal’s defense of the safety (...) condition is unsuccessful, and that the safety condition on knowledge should be rejected. (shrink)

The development of artificial intelligence (AI) in medicine raises fundamental ethical issues. As one example, AI systems in the field of mental health successfully detect signs of mental disorders, such as depression, by using data from social media. These AI depression detectors (AIDDs) identify users who are at risk of depression prior to any contact with the healthcare system. The article focuses on the ethical implications of AIDDs regarding affected users’ health-related autonomy. Firstly, it presents the (ethical) discussion of AI (...) in medicine and, specifically, in mental health. Secondly, two models of AIDDs using social media data and different usage scenarios are introduced. Thirdly, the concept of patient autonomy, according to Beauchamp and Childress, is critically discussed. Since this concept does not encompass the specific challenges linked with the digital context of AIDDs in social media sufficiently, the current analysis suggests, finally, an extended concept of health-related digital autonomy. (shrink)

In this paper, I hope to solve a problem that’s as old as the hills: the problem of contingency for religious belief. Paradigmatic examples of this argument begin with a counterfactual premise: had we been born at a different time or in a difference place, we easily could have held different beliefs on religious topics. Ultimately, and perhaps by additional steps, we’re meant to reach the skeptical conclusion that very many of our religious beliefs do not amount to knowledge. I (...) survey some historical examples of this argument, and I try to fill the gap between the counterfactual premise and the skeptical conclusion as forcefully as possible. I consider the following possibilities: there are no additional steps in the argument; or there are and they concern the alleged safety condition on knowledge, or the alleged non-accidentality condition on knowledge, or the unclarity produced by disagreement. On every possibility, the argument from the counterfactual premise to the conclusion of widespread skepticism is invalid. It seems, then, that there is no serious problem of contingency for religious belief. (shrink)

There is much to admire in John Pittard’s recent book on the epistemology of disagreement. But here we develop one concern about the role that rational insight plays in his project. Pittard develops and defends a view on which a party to peer disagreement can show substantial partiality to his own view, so long as he enjoys even moderate rational insight into the truth of his view or the cogency of his reasoning for his view. Pittard argues that this may (...) happen in ordinary cases of religious disagreement—cases in which it’s a live skeptical possibility that one is misdescribing his insight, or not having insight at all—and therefore one need not be strongly conciliatory even in the face of peer disagreement. Yet Pittard agrees that one should be strongly conciliatory in cases of disagreement involving, e.g., visual perception and dim rational insight, since the sort of fallible, corrigible evidence involved in such cases may be counterbalanced by symmetrical evidence on the part of one’s disagreeing peer. We worry that there’s an inconsistency here. If it’s unreasonable to show partiality to one’s visual experience (or dim rational insight) in cases like “Horse Race” and “Restaurant Check,” it’s likewise unreasonable to show partiality in religious disagreements to one’s moderate rational insight, fallible and corrigible as it is. (shrink)

This paper elaborates on a theory of the ideological public sphere in the age of digital media. It describes the public sphere as an initially ascending and then descending communication process that includes both polarising and integrating publics, which are organised by antagonistic media and compromise-building mass media. This framework allows us to distinguish between hegemonic, populist, and popular-oriented flows of communication, as well as register changes in the interplay of different publics driven by digital media platforms. Digital transformations of (...) the public sphere give rise to antagonistic and networked-individualistic flows of populist communication that put public hegemony under constant pressure. The challenge is to find ways to strengthen popular communications that enable democratic learning processes and the flourishing of communicative competences of all citizens. (shrink)

Some philosophers believe that, when epistemic peers disagree, each has an obligation to accord the other’s assessment equal weight as her own. Other philosophers worry that this Equal-Weight View is vulnerable to straightforward counterexamples, and that it requires an unacceptable degree of spinelessness with respect to our most treasured philosophical, political, and religious beliefs. I think that both of these allegations are false. To show this, I carefully state the Equal-Weight View, motivate it, describe apparent counterexamples to it, and then (...) explain away the apparent counterexamples. Finally, I adapt those explanations to cases of religious disagreement. In the end, we reach the surprising conclusion that—even if the Equal-Weight View is true—in very many cases of religious disagreement between apparent epistemic peers, the parties to the disagreement need not be conciliatory. And what goes for religious beliefs goes for political and philosophical beliefs as well. This strongly suggests that the View does not demand an unacceptable degree of spinelessness. (shrink)

In the standard thought experiments, dualism strikes many philosophers as true, including many non-dualists. This ‘striking’ generates prima facie justification: in the absence of defeaters, we ought to believe that things are as they seem to be, i.e. we ought to be dualists. In this paper, I examine several proposed undercutting defeaters for our dualist intuitions. I argue that each proposal fails, since each rests on a false assumption, or requires empirical evidence that it lacks, or overgenerates defeaters. By the (...) end, our prima facie justification for dualism remains undefeated. I close with one objection concerning the dialectical role of rebutting defeaters, and I argue that the prospects for a successful rebutting defeater for our dualist intuitions are dim. Since dualism emerges undefeated, we ought to believe it. (shrink)

The online version of the original article can be found under doi:10.1007/s11948-007-9045-2.

Large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT or Google’s Bard have shown significant performance on a variety of text-based tasks, such as summarization, translation, and even the generation of new...

According to Ladyman, the world consists of nothing more than relations that relate to no particulars. Could the world be nothing but structure? In this chapter it is argued that even though there are a number of problems with the standard view of relations accompanied by a particularist ontology, substituting for it a world of pure structure is not progress. A world of pure structure would be no more than a Platonic entity, lacking any resources for concretization. Consequently, there would (...) be no possibility of distinguishing between a world-kind and its concrete instance or instances. It is also argued that the view has insufficient empirical motivation. The history of science does not support the claim that structure is preserved through theory change nor that the structural components of a theory are extricable from its ontological commitments. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The difference between perception and cognition seems introspectively obvious in many cases. Perceiving and thinking have also been assigned quite different roles, in epistemology, in theories of reference and of mental content, in philosophy of psychology, and elsewhere. Yet what is the nature of the distinction? In what way, or ways, do perception and cognition differ? The paper reviews recent work on these questions. Four main respects in which perception and cognition have been held to differ are discussed. First, (...) their phenomenal character, such as the often-remarked vivacity or immediacy of perception. Second, the way in which they represent the world, e.g. the non-propositional nature of the contents, or non-discursive character of the vehicles, that have been held to characterise perceptual representation. Third, their place in cognitive architecture, i.e., roughly, in the information-flow of the mind, such as their alleged (non-)modularity. Fourth, their mind-world relations, e.g. the way in which perceptions seem to be tightly causally linked with distal or proximal stimuli. Against this background, we distinguish some main options for an account of the perception/cognition distinction, in particular concerning whether there is one, several, or no interesting and principled distinction(s) to be drawn here. (shrink)

According to Russell and Norvig’s (2009) classification, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is the field that aims at building systems which either think rationally, act rationally, think like humans, or...

In the recent literature on the nature of knowledge, a rivalry has emerged between modalism and explanationism. According to modalism, knowledge requires that our beliefs track the truth across some appropriate set of possible worlds. Modalists tend to focus on two modal conditions: sensitivity and safety. According to explanationism, knowledge requires only that beliefs bear the right sort of explanatory relation to the truth. In slogan form: knowledge is believing something because it’s true. In this paper, we aim to vindicate (...) explanationism from some recent objections offered by Gualtiero Piccinini, Dario Mortini, and Kenneth Boyce and Andrew Moon. Together, these authors present five purported counterexamples to the sufficiency of the explanationist analysis for knowledge. In addition, Mortini devises a clever argument that explanationism entails the violation of a plausible closure principle on knowledge. We will argue that explanationism is innocent of all these charges against it, and we hope that the strength of the defense we offer of explanationism is evidence in its favor, and a reason to investigate explanationism further as the long-elusive truth about the nature of knowledge. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

This paper argues for the normative significance of attention. Attention plays an important role when describing an individual’s mind and agency, and in explaining many central facts about that individual. In addition, many in the public want answers and guidance with regard to normative questions about attention. Given that attention is both descriptively central and the public cares about normative guidance with regard to it, attention should be central also in normative philosophy. We need an ethics of attention: a field (...) of study of which normative pressures, if any, govern attention. Like the ethics of belief, the ethics of attention will connect those normative questions to issues regarding the nature of attention, i.e. to what is subject to such normative pressures. Philosophers should develop an ethics of attention that helps to provide normative guidance and that is commensurate in its richness to the descriptive significance of attention. The second half of the paper sketches a framework that may help us to get started at developing the ethics of attention. (shrink)

Wie erfährt man Anerkennung? Sebastian Bandelins an der Sozialphilosophie des Pragmatismus orientierte Weiterentwicklung einer kritischen Theorie der Anerkennung zeigt: Anerkennen ist nicht als Bestätigung vorgängiger Identitätsansprüche zu verstehen, sondern als ein sozialer Prozess, in dessen Verlauf sich bestimmte praktische Selbstverhältnisse realisieren - und sodann durch ihre sozialen Folgen in eine Krise geführt, vor diesem Hintergrund kritisch reflektiert und schließlich überwunden werden. Der Begriff gelingender Anerkennung muss sich schließlich darauf beziehen, wie dieser Prozess der Erfahrung, in dem Selbstverständnisse und Handlungsformen hinterfragt (...) und neu gebildet werden, in sinnvoller Weise organisiert werden kann. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Giving without the expectation of reward is difficult to understand in organizational contexts. In opposition to a logic based on self-interest or a sense of duty, a “logic of gift” has been proposed as a way to understand the phenomenon of free, unconditional giving. However, the rationale behind, and effects of, this logic have been under-explored. This paper responds by first clarifying the three logics of action—the logic of exchange, the logic of duty, and the logic of gift—and then explains (...) how their balanced integration promises to enhance organizational life and outcomes. Having explicated the unique character and contributions of the logic of gift, the paper further suggests practical implications for management. Encouraging the logic of gift fosters more humane relationships within organizations and to enable individuals to be generous in ways that inspire trust and promote creativity. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

This study was designed to survey the extent to which private companies in Sweden take structural measures within the field of business ethics: Codes of Ethics; Ethics Committees; Ethics Officers and Ethics Training. This was done in two steps. Through a nation-wide telephone survey, a population of "active" companies were identified. These companies received a questionnaire with detailed questions regarding the design, usage and effects of these measures. The percentage of active companies were found to be a high 46%. National (...) and industry characteristics are proposed as explanatory factors. (shrink)

This paper defends and develops the structuring account of conscious attention: attention is the conscious mental process of structuring one’s stream of consciousness so that some parts of it are more central than others. In the first part of the paper, I motivate the structuring account. Drawing on a variety of resources I argue that the phenomenology of attention cannot be fully captured in terms of how the world appears to the subject, as well as against an atomistic conception of (...) attention. In the second part of the paper, I show how the structuring account can be made precise: attention causes and causally sustains phenomenal relations to hold between the parts of the stream of consciousness; most importantly the relation of one part being peripheral to another. I end by pointing out consequences for both the scientific study of attention as well as for several areas of central philosophical interest. (shrink)

The present article revolves around the notion of universality and its relation to freedom and temporal orientation in contemporary political thought, with a focus on Susan Buck-Morss' notion of universality. The purpose is twofold. Firstly, I discern and critique the historico-political premises of her approach. Secondly, I suggest an alternative historico-political approach to universality addressing the drawbacks of her approach. I present three objections to her approach. Drawing on Arendt's distinction between liberation and the practice of freedom, I first present (...) a critique of the conceptualisation of freedom on which Buck-Morss' approach hinges, arguing that she overemphasises the moment of liberation. Thereafter, I turn to her reflections on historical orientation. My third objection concentrates on Buck-Morss' concept of universality. As a heuristic tool to expound on my critique, I activate the distinction between fictive and ideal universality as suggested by Étienne Balibar. I contend that Arendt's distinction between liberation and the practice of freedom efficiently elucidates the questions at stake in Balibar's discussion, as well as how his distinction points to the limits of Buck-Morss' argumentation. Ultimately, I contend that these critical remarks open up for a more dialectical approach to universality as a historical-political problem. (shrink)